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THE PENILE CODE: THE GENDERED NATURE
OF THE LANGUAGE OF LAW
Matthew A. Rittert
I. INTRODUCTION
peneal (pn'al) adj. [[< Gr poini, penalty]] of, for, constituting,
or deserving punishment1
penecil (pen'sal) n. [[< L penis, tail]] a rod-shaped instrument
with a core of graphite, crayon, etc. that is sharpened to a point
for writing, etc.2
peenis (pnis) n .... [[L]] the male organ of sexual intercourse
3
My fingers rest uneasily upon the keyboard of my electronic
pen as I reflect upon how to write a paper regarding Women and
Law.4 I am sensitive to being male-a white, heterosexual male-
thoroughly steeped (both culturally and academically) in the legal,
philosophical, and theological heritage of the West.
5 Feminist
thought has taught me that all things said are said from a particu-
lar perspective.6 More profoundly, feminist thought has taught me
that gender identity may well inform the very structure of thought
from which one's perspective is articulated.7 In large measure, this
t Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., 1997, California West-
ern School of Law; B.A., 1978, Rice University; M.Div., 1991, Boston University School
of Theology; S.T.M., 1982, Yale Divinity School; M.A., 1983, Yale University; M.Phil.,
1987, Yale University; Ph.D., 1986, Yale University.
I WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 434 (1990) (emphasis added).
2 Id. (emphasis added).
3 Id. at 435 (emphasis added).
4 Contrary to my academic training and inclination, I will write in the first person.
As much as I am able, I will thus refrain from disguising my personal voice as that of
the anonymously authoritative "third person."
5 I hold a Bachelor of Arts in both philosophy and religious studies, a Master of
Divinity in biblical studies and theology, a Master of Sacred Theology in philosophical
theology, a Master of Arts, a Master of Philosophy, and a Doctor of Philosophy in
philosophical theology, and a Doctor of Jurisprudence.
6 See generally Martha Minow, Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REv. 10, 57-74 (1987)
[hereinafter Minow, Justice Engendered].
7 Feminist thought thus stands firmly (albeit critically) upon the ground provided
it by the history of Western philosophy. From Descartes through Kant, Hegel, Nietz-
sche (especially Nietzsche, having been the first to declare that knowledge has to do
not with the expression of truth, but with the possession of power) to both Heidegger
and Wittgenstein, philosophy has been essentially the attempt to think thinking-to
articulate the structure of thinking whereby humans experience, understand, know,
judge, feel, and act in the world. See generally E.W.F. TOMLIN, THE WESTERN PHILOSO-
PHERS: AN INTRODUCTION (1967).
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paper will be an inquiry into that claim. It will consequently be an
inquiry that is perhaps informed by the very structure of thought
into which it inquires. I am, after all, a man.
This inquiry will focus on the language of law. In the West,
the law is written law; and it has been predominately written by
men. Are these two facts related, and if so, how? Is it significant
that the law is penned by those with a penis? Is there a structural
relationship between the pen and the penis-a penile code? And if
so, how has it framed the character of the law? These questions
will govern my inquiry into the language of law.
"Legal language does more than express thoughts."8 Lucinda
Finley suggests law is a realm of discourse that exercises an ex-
traordinary influence over the construction of social reality.9
"[T]hose who seek to use law to help empower and positively
change the status of a group such as women must, in their theory
and practice, be concerned with the origins, nature, and structure
of legal language and legal reasoning."' This concern, expanded
here to include not only the status of women but the status of men
as well, will guide my own inquiry into the language of law.
One might well ask why I-as a man-choose to occupy myself
with a feminist concern. It is certainly not because I feel the need
to champion the cause of women. Women are quite well able to
champion their own cause. Moreover, there is no need for men to
speak for women-we have presumed to do that for long enough.
Nor is it because I wish to add my voice in protest against the atroc-
ities systematically practiced against women by men around the
globe: African female genital mutilation," Chinese abandonment
of infant girls, 12 Serbian military strategies of rape, 3 Indian bride-
or widow-burning,14 Thai sexual slavery,15 world-wide domestic vio-
8 Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered
Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. Rv. 886, 888 (1989).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 890.
11 See generally Nahid Toubia, Female Genital Mutilation, in WOMEN'S RIGHTS HumAN
RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 224 (Julie Peters & Andrea Wolper
eds., 1995); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation" Feminist Human
Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. Hum. RTS. J. 1 (1995).
12 See generally Sharon K Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter
and Thoughts Towards An(other) Vision, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 249 (1992).
13 See generally HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2 WAR CRIMES IN BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
(1993); Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture, 45 DuKE L.J.
651 (1996).
14 See generally Indira Jaising, Violence Against Women: The Indian Perspective, in Wo-
MEN'S RIGHTS HuMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 51 (Julie Peters
& Andrea Wolper eds., 1995).
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lence,' 6 to name a few. Rather, my feminist concerns are
prompted by the extraordinarily mundane yet myriad ways in
which men exercise sexual authority over women-a sexual author-
ity systematically reinforced by the law.
The fabric of our culture, both public and private, is interwo-
ven with the subordination of the feminine to the dominance of
the masculine. In a strong sense, the meaning of manhood is the de-
meaning of womanhood. From this oppression of women, all men
benefit in countless subtle and not so subtle ways. As a man, this is
my privilege as well. I am profoundly distressed by this. Thus, in
order to overcome it, I must understand it. Hence, my feminist
concerns and the motive for this discussion.
I have divided my inquiry into three stages. First, I will reflect
upon the epistemological structure of language as it pertains to the
logic of the written word. Second, I will articulate a feminist cri-
tique of legal language. Third, on the basis of these epistemologi-
cal and feminist critiques, I will offer a revisionary understanding
of the sexual oppression ostensibly endemic to the language of law.
My central thesis is that the sexual oppression exercised by men
over women is coincident, if not confluent, with the logic of the
written word, and that the law consequently manifests this sexually
oppressive logic. In conclusion, I will propose a way to counter, if
not overcome, this oppression.
II. THE OcuLAR EPISTEMOLOGY OF THE PEN(IS)
[Tihe written letters bring death but the Spirit gives life.
17
In about the fifth-century B.C.E., the written word began to
assume its status as the quintessential mode for the cultural com-
munication of ideas." Writing became the paradigmatic form of
15 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A MODERN FORM OF SLAVERY: TRAFFICKING OF
BURMESE WOMEN AND GIRLS INTO BROTHELS IN THAILAND (1993).
16 See generally Rhonda Copelon, Intimate Terror: Understanding Domestic Violence as
Torture, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 116
(Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994); Joan Fitzpatrick, The Use of International Human Rights
Norms to Combat Violence Against Women, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 532 (RebeccaJ. Cook ed., 1994); Kenneth Roth, Domestic
Violence as an International Human Rights Issue, in HUMAN RIGHTS OF WOMEN: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 326 (Rebecca J. Cook ed., 1994).
17 2 Corinthians 3:6 (Jerusalem) (emphasis added).
18 Within a few decades of each other, the texts that founded most of the so-called
modern world cultural/religious movements had been written: the Platonic Dialogues
(Plato), see GREAT DIALOGUES OF PLATO (Eric H. Warmington & Philip G. Rouse eds.
& W.H.D. Rouse trans., 1956);Jewish Prophecy (Ezekiel, Isaiah, Jeremiah), see MEYER
WAXMAN, A HANDBOOK OFJUDAISM (2d ed. 1984); the Avesta (Zoroaster), see A.V. Wi-
LIAMSJACKSON, ZOROASTER: THE PROPHET OF ANCIENT IRAN (1926); the Bhagavad Gitd,
1998]
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expression. It remains so today. The communication of ideas
must be written if it is to be taken seriously. The structure of the
written word consequently governs not only what we say, but how
we say it. More profoundly, it governs how we think. 9 Our think-
ing is dictated by the pen.
An examination of how the written word governs the way we
think would properly comprise a lengthy philosophical treatise.
Given the constraints of the present discussion, I will confine my-
self to a few specific remarks on the matter. For these remarks, I
am indebted to the work of Walter J. Ong, S.J., who has written
extensively on the cognitive dynamics attendant upon the various
forms of communication (oral/aural, textual, printed, and
telecommunicational) .20
Communication through the written word is one effected
through ocularity. The written word is seen, not heard. The cogni-
tive dynamics endemic to the written word are consequently gov-
erned by the logic of vision. Knowing becomes essentially a matter
of seeing. Consider the various metaphors we use for understand-
ing:21 insight, reflection, speculation, illumination, observation, ex-
position, idea (Latin video, to see 22), glimmering of, evidence,
elucidate, explicate, clarify, represent, demonstrate, show, discern,
analyze, distinguish, define, outline, envision, cast light on, far-
sighted, etc. Consider as well the various metaphors we use for not
understanding: obscure, clouded, unclear, indistinct, complicated,
see A.C. BHAKTIVEDANTA SwAMi PRABHUPADA, BHAGAVAD-GiTA: As IT IS (1972); the Bud-
dhist Sutras, see ENTERING THE STREAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE BUDDHA AND His
TEACHINGS (Samuel Bercholz & Sherab Ch6dzin Kohn eds., 1993); the Tao-Te Ching
(Lao Tzu), see A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (Wing-Tsit Chan trans., 1963);
and the Sayings of Confucius, see id. See generally DAVID S. Noss &JOHN B. Noss, MAN'S
RELIGIONS (7th ed. 1984). Prior to that, cultural/religious heritage was communi-
cated largely through the mythologies and cosmogonies of oral tradition. Id. It is not
coincidental that the emergence of religious/ethical sensibility arose with the advent
of the written word. Nor is it coincidental that in the West, the modern revolutions-
religious (Reformation), see TOMLIN, supra note 7; philosophical (Idealism), see id.;
political (Democracy), see id.; economic (Capitalism), see id.; technological (Indus-
trial), see GEORGE BAsALLA, THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY (1988); and literary (the
novel), seeJ.M. COHEN, A HISTORY OF WESTERN LITERATURE (1963)-followed upon
the advent of the printed word (hence, mass textuality and the beginning of common
literacy).
19 See generally WALTER J. ONG, S.J., PRESENCE OF THE WORD (1967) [hereinafter
ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD].
20 See id.; see also WALTERJ. ONG, S.J., INTERFACES OF THE WORD (1977) [hereinafter
ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD]; WALTER J. ONG, S.J., ORALITY AND LITERACY (1982)
[hereinafter ONG, ORALITY AND LITERACY].
21 ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD, supra note 20, at 133.
22 CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY 641-42 (1959).
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dark, hidden, elusive, scattered, shortsighted, etc. The logic of vi-
sion structures that which we understand as knowledge and mean-
ing. Under the paradigm of the written word, knowledge is
governed by the dynamics of vision-the ocular epistemology of
the pen.
Within such an epistemology, knowledge is quintessentially a
matter of explanation23 (Latin explanare, to lay out on a surface
2 4 ).
This laying out characterizes the mode of knowledge as well as the
subject matter of knowledge. On the one hand, the written word,
as the mode of knowledge, is constituted as a literal laying out.
Words are laid out: strung together-articulated (Latin articulare,
to join21)-in terms of a particular grammatical and semantic or-
der. On the other hand, the subject matter of knowledge is also
constituted as a laying out. Vision has to do with surfaces: it direc-
tionally reflects one thing after another in an ordered succession of
fixes. 26 Ocular knowledge is consequently a dissecting apprehen-
sion, characterized principally as definition (Latin definire, to draw
a line around 27 ) and analysis (Greek ana-iein, to break into
parts28 ). As explanation, knowledge therefore takes the measure
of things, laying them out in ordered succession. Entombed within
the order of the written word, this measure of things becomes fix-
edly permanent-a text.
2 1
Ocular epistemology further exerts a profound impact on the
nature of both the subject and object of knowledge. In essence, it
serves radically to distinguish the subject from the object of knowl-
edge."° The visual paradigm of knowledge places the viewed world
23 ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD, supra note 20, at 122.
24 CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY, Supra note 22, at 230.
25 Id. at 59.
26 ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 129.
27 CASSELL'S LATIN DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 173.
28 THE OxFORD DICTIONARY OF MODERN GREEK 10 (1982).
29 ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 136. Note the idiom of referring
to a text as a "monument" to one's thought. Worthy of note also is the fact that when
knowledge or understanding becomes fixed within textuality, it becomes abstract.
This is because the written word must establish its own internal context of meaning.
Unlike the spoken word, the written word cannot rely upon the circumstantial con-
text of actuality that surrounds oral communication. ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD,
supra note 19, at 116. In a sense, a text must comprise its own world. By its nature, a
text is therefore an abstract body of meaning, abstracted from the world in which it
was written.
30 ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 135. It might even be argued
that the subject and the object of knowledge, as epistemological categories, are them-
selves generated by the logic of an ocular epistemology. That is, absent an ocular
epistemology, knowledge may well not be structured in terms of a subject and object
at all. Such a claim, of course, is philosophically problematic by virtue of the fact that
1998]
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out in front of the viewer; the viewer is backed away from the
viewed. No longer part of the viewed, the viewer becomes radically
other than the viewed. The eye can only look upon what is other
than itself. In effect, reality is objectified as external.3 1 As the ex-
ternal object of knowledge, reality is reduced to the seen: the ex-
plained; the defined and analyzed; the measured, ordered, and
ruled.
Inasmuch as the object of knowledge becomes radically exteri-
orized within an ocular epistemology, the subject of knowledge is
made ultimately to disappear. 2 Able to see only what is other than
itself, the eye distances itself from all that is seen. Vision therefore
radically individuates the viewer. Under this visual paradigm, the
subject of knowledge is consequently an individual . Having indi-
viduated itself, the subject of knowledge is alienated from an objec-
tified reality. The seeing I is backed away from the seen world.
The individual I is consequently an abstract L As an abstracted I,
the subject of knowledge is lifted from the order of objective real-
ity. The abstract individual I is consequently an autonomous I: not
subject to the rule or measure of what is seen as other than itself.
The abstract autonomous individual I is thus elided from reality.
As elided from reality, the subject of knowledge becomes the uni-
versal I: characterized by no particularity; circumscribed by no defi-
nition; seeing but not seen. In ultima, the subject of knowledge
disappears.33
Ocular epistemology thus generates on the one hand an ob-
ject of knowledge characterized by exteriority, and on the other
hand a subject of knowledge characterized by a universally abstract
autonomous individuality-the L The paradigmatic form for the
expression of such knowledge is the written word. And from the
structure of the written word, the I acquires its linguistic character
as author.3 4 As author, however, the I would retain its universally
abstract autonomous individuality. Indeed, the authority of a text
the subject/object distinction would itself be construed as an object of knowledge.
But aside from this logistical difficulty, the argument would contribute little to the
present discussion.
31 ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 228.
32 ONG, INTERFACES OF THE WORD, supra note 20, at 121-22 (quoting Father Ber-
nard Lonergan, Consciousness and the Trinity, Address Before the North American
College in Rome (Spring 1963)).
33 Hegel perhaps said it best when he offered his ultimate definition of the "I":
"Ego is Ego, I am I." G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MIND 219 (J.B. Baillie
trans., Harper & Row 1987) (1807).
34 When law is expressed, or written, it acquires a "relatively objective quality."
ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 229.
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is wholly contingent upon this retention. The written word exer-
cises authority to the extent that it reflects the order of objectified
reality. 5 This is achieved, oddly enough, through the elision of
the author. The author must disappear from the text. For the text
to speak, its author must be silent. 6 An authoritative word is the
universal word; abstracted from the context of its author; autono-
mously meaningful. Intrusion of the author into the fabric of a
text detracts from its authority. True authorship is therefore
achieved through the authority of the text itself. For thus does the
authority of the text truly express its author: the universally abstract
autonomous individual. The invisible Iwrites as an absent author.
Hence the ocular epistemology of the pen. The important
thing to note here is that the epistemological structure of the writ-
ten word dictates not only the character of the subject and object
of knowledge respectively, but it dictates accordingly the character
of textual authority-an explanatory fixation of the object of
knowledge as authored by an elided subject of knowledge. The
written word pens reality: fixes it, marks it, lays it out, and articulates
it. By virtue of such penetration, the text exercises its authority,
thereby absenting its author.
Historically, men have held the pen. Characterized by the ab-
stract autonomy and universal individuality of the invisible I, the
absent author has nonetheless invariably been male. Ironically
enough, this absention is seldom, if historically ever, remarked
upon by men." Rather, it has been remarked almost invariably by
women; and, as Mary Daly notes, it is a remark that seems especially
distressing to men. "Having penned women into the mirror world
of their archetypes, the authorized authors have refused women
the right to write saying to wayward women that to publish is to
perish. 38 Why this distress? The remark poses a disturbing ques-
tion: does gender inform the logic of the written word? Is the ocu-
lar epistemology of the pen informed by the penis? This question
is addressed by the feminist critique of legal language.
35 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. A text is authoritative to the extent
that it internally and independently manifests the reality it lays out (i.e., explains).
Structurally abstracted from reality, the authority of the written word is thus a func-
tion of its internal and independent coherence as adequate to the order of reality it
scripts.
36 Contrast this to the authority exercised by the speech of oral cultures: the au-
thority of "we say." ONG, PRESENCE OF THE WORD, supra note 19, at 229.
37 There is a reason for this. As will be discussed below, this remark obviates the
abstract autonomy and universal individuality of the absented author. It provides
him, horror of horrors, with a gender identity.
38 MARY DALV, PURE LUST 121 (1984) [hereinafter DALY, PURE LUST].
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III. ENGENDERED LAW
Man fucks woman; subject verb object.39
The law is written. It is constituted as a realm of discourse in
terms of which the social relationships of a culture are legally con-
structed.4" Through its written word, the law therefore structures
social reality, it lays it out and codifies it. Due to the fact that it
enforces the social reality it structures, the law is a uniquely power-
ful form of discourse. 4 1 Perhaps more than any other realm of dis-
course, the law thus manifests the logic of the written word.
In this section, I will first offer a philosophical critique of what
may viably be construed as the governing language of the law,
rights talk. I will then detail a feminist critique of rights talk.
Through these respective critiques, I will demonstrate how the lan-
guage of the law is gendered, both formally and substantively.
In many cultures, talk of rights has become the authoritative
language of law.4 2 We have come to understand what the law
means in terms of human rights. Rights talk dictates not only what
the law is, but what the law should be. In some strong sense, law
has become for us a function of rights talk. For contemporary ju-
risprudence, such rights are possessed by individuals, 43 and they
are held by any one individual to the extent that they are held by
all individuals. "Rights" are characteristically abstract, intangible,
and therefore alienating. As such, rights talk requires that the "re-
production of [that] alienation [be] a condition of group member-
ship," and one that applies equally to all.44 Thus, intrinsic to the
notion of human rights is the idea that they are equally held by all
human beings.4 5 The central claim of rights talk, in other words, is
39 Catherine MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for
Theory, 7 SIGNS 515, 541 (1982) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method,
and the State] (emphasis added).
40 Finley, supra note 8, at 888.
41 See Carol Smart, Law's Power, the Sexed Body, and Feminist Discourse, 17J.L. & Soc'v
194, 196 (1990); see also Finley, supra note 8, at 888.
42 MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 7 (1991).
43 RONALD DWORK1N, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY xi (1978).
44 Peter Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Consciousness and the Pact of the Withdrawn
Selves, in JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS, PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 226,
226 (Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit eds., 1994).
45 "Government must not only treat people with concern and respect, but with
equal concern and respect." DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 272-73. Dworkin distin-
guishes the right to equal treatment from the right to treatment as an equal. The
latter right is the more fundamental, embodying an essentially moral claim; the for-
mer is a derivative economic right having to do with the distribution of societal goods.
DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 273.
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the claim to equality.46 Rights talk dictates that all individuals
equally possess certain human rights. "By 'rights' . .. [are meant]
those rights which are alleged to belong to human beings as such
and . . . to attach equally to all individuals ....
In essence, then, rights talk speaks about the universality of
the individual-the individual as such. Rights talk thus must con-
strue the individual as an abstract individual.48 The individual spo-
ken by rights talk is an individual abstracted from any particular
communal identity. Communal identity is subsequent to the essen-
tial being of the individual. How the abstract individual com-
munally identifies himself or herself is consequently a function not
of how he or she ought to do so (in proper accordance with its
essential communal nature), but how he or she chooses to do so.
The abstract individual is thus an autonomous individual.49 What
the abstract autonomous individual chooses to be is constrained
only by his or her discretion. °
Rights talk substantively speaks the abstract autonomy of the
universal individual through the proclamation of two fundamental
complementary rights: the right to privacy,51 and the right to self-
46 DWORKIN, supra note 43, at 273.
47 ALISDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 66 (1981).
48 On the one hand, individuals are construed as abstractly given-given interests,
needs, desires, etc. On the other hand, society is construed as the set of possible
social relationships which are suited, more or less adequately, to individuals' require-
ments. Societal rules and institutions are accordingly construed as the means of per-
mitting this fit between the individual and society. "The crucial point about this
conception is that the relevant features of individuals determining the ends which
social arrangements are held (actually or ideally) to fulfil[l] . .. are assumed as given,
independently of a social context." STEVEN LuKEs, INDIVIDUALISM 73 (1973).
A "right" has three phenomenological dimensions. First, to the extent
that individuals are represented as "having" rights, these rights signify
social experiences that are merely possible rather than the experiences
themselves.... Second, these rights are conceived as being granted to
the individual from an outside source, from "the State" which either
creates them (in the positivist version of the constitutional thought-
schema) or recognizes them (in the natural-law version) through the
passage of "laws." Thus, insofar as the individual emerges from his pas-
sive station to act and interact with others on the basis of his rights, he
does so because he has been "allowed" to do so in advance. Third, in-
tersubjective action itself is conceived to occur "through" or "by virtue
of" the "exercise" of these rights.
Gabel, sup-a note 44, at 227.
49 MAcINTYRE, supra note 47, at 58.
50 Such autonomy, however, is not arbitrary. It simply means that the behavior of
the individual is ultimately that of the individual-not a function of social constraint
beyond the control of the individual.
51 See LuKEs, supra note 48, at 59-66.
In general the idea of privacy refers to a sphere that is not of
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:1
development.5 2 The right to privacy dictates that individual auton-
omy be respected by the various communal involvements of the
individual. Privacy generates a host of protective rights-leave me
alone.53 The right to self-development dictates that the individual
be allowed autonomously to pursue whatever mode of self-realiza-
tion the individual should choose. Self-development generates a
host of promotive rights-let me be me.54 The complementary
rights of privacy/self-development programmatically inform all
communal involvements of the universally abstract autonomous in-
dividual: political, 55 economic,5 6 religious,
5 7 and philosophical. 5 8
proper concern to others. It implies a negative relation between the
individual and some wider 'public[,'] including the state-a relation of
non-interference with, or non-intrusion into, some range of his
thoughts and/or action. This condition may be achieved either by his
withdrawal or by the 'public's' forbearance.
LurEs, supra note 48, at 66.
The modern pre-occupation with privacy stands in rather stark contrast to classi-
cal thought on the matter:
the privative trait of privacy, indicated in the word itself, was all-impor-
tant; it meant literally a state of being deprived of something .... A
man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to
enter the public realm, or like the barbarian, had chosen not to estab-
lish such a realm, was not fully human.
LuKEs, supra note 48, at 59 (quoting HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 35
(1959)).
For modernity, however, privacy does not denote a privation. In fact, "[s]imilar
to property in its heyday, privacy was vaunted as a superright, a trump." GLENDON,
supra note 42, at 60. The singularly American insistence upon the right to privacy is
probably most directly attributable to the writings ofJohn Stuart Mill, seeJOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1978) (1859).
Although it did not enter the American vernacular until the late nineteenth century,
it has since become the right in terms of which all other protective rights are under-
stood. GLENDON, supra note 42, at 48-61. "It is the right to be let alone." Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
52 The right to self-development has primarily to do with the preservation of indi-
viduality as such. It is generally traceable to German Romantic notions of uniqueness.
LuKEs, supra note 48, at 67.
53 For example, rights against various forms of government intrusion, see, e.g.,
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
religious commitments, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
54 For example, rights to life and liberty, see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) and Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990); the free-
dom of speech, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) and R. A. V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992); the right to association, see, e.g., Board of Dir. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); the right to procreate, see, e.g., Poe
v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); the
right to education, see, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
55 The form of political government programmatically appropriate to the idea of
the abstract autonomous individual is a government whose authority is based upon
the consent of its individual citizens-a democratized social contract whereby the gov-
ernment protects/promotes the interests of its individual citizens. LuKEs, supra note
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In speaking about the universally abstract autonomous individ-
ual, rights talk thus constructs a social reality of competing individ-
uals perennially anxious of societal intrusion.59 Inasmuch as law
48, at 79-87. This view, of course, has a long lineage traceable to Hobbes, see THOMAS
HOBBES, MAN AND CITIZEN (Bernard Gert ed. & Charles T. Wood et al. trans., Hackett
Publishing Company 1991) (1658 and 1642); Locke, seeJOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES
OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge University Press 1990) (1690); and
Rousseau, seeJEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, in BASIC POLIT-
ICAL WRITINGS (Donald A. Cress ed. & trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1762).
56 "Economic individualism implies a consequent presumption against economic
regulation, whether by Church or State." Luts, supra note 48, at 88 (emphasis ad-
ded). This view received much of its controlling ideology from Adam Smith, seeADAM
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., Random House, Inc. 1937)
(1776).
57 See LuKEs, supra note 48, at 94-99.
Religious individualism may be defined as the view that the individual
believer does not need intermediaries, that he has the primary responsi-
bility for his own spiritual destiny, that he has the right and duty to
come to his own relationship with his God in his own way and by his
own effort.
LusEs, supra note 48, at 94.
58 Ostensibly beginning with Descartes (see RENE DESCARTES, DESCARTES SELEC-
TIONS (Ralph M. Eaton ed., Charles Scribner's Sons 1955) (1911-12)), and receiving
progressively sophisticated treatment through a lineage highlighted by Hume (see
DAVID HUME, ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY (Eugene F. Miller ed., 1987)
(1777)), Kant (see THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT (Carl J. Friedrich ed., Random
House, Inc. 1993)), and Husserl (BARRY SMITH & DAVID WOODRUFF SMITH, THE CAM-
BRIDGE COMPANION TO HUSSERL (1995)), the structural criteriology of knowledge is
held to reside within the individual.
590 On the one hand, rights talk structures a bifurcation between the individual and
the society in which the individual would exercise its self-protection/promotion.
MAcINrvRE, supra note 47, at 33. Rights are designed to preserve the individual
against intrusion upon its autonomy. "The formal legal framework of modern demo-
cratic societies is the guardian of the abstract individual." LuKEs, supra note 48, at
152-53. What rights talk guards against is intrusion upon individual autonomy by vari-
ous and sundry forms of society, whether political, ethical, or religious. Rights talk
speaks the autonomy of the abstract individual. Insofar as rights talk thus speaks, it
protests against societal intrusion, hence a structural division between the individual
and the society in which the individual would exist as such.
On the other hand, rights talk structures as well a divisiveness between members
of a society. The fundamental complementarity between rights to privacy and rights
to self-development diverges when they are respectively claimed by competing individ-
uals. The self-promotion of one inevitably and invariably infringes upon the self-pro-
tection of another. Communal dialogue is replaced by the protest of competing
claims, social accommodation by righteous indignation, mutual amelioration by stri-
dent self-assertion.
[R]ights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic expectations,
heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward
consensus, accommodation, or at least the discovery of common
ground.... Our rights talk is like a book of words and phrases without
a grammar and syntax. Various rights are proclaimed or proposed.
The catalog of individual liberties expands, without much consideration
of the ends to which they are oriented, their relationship to one an-
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speaks the substantive language of rights talk, it adjudicates social
conflict by measuring the rights of claimants against each other.
As Leslie Bender notes, rights talk therefore conduces to ajurispru-
dence of abstract universal principles.6 ° In order to adjudicate the
claims of competing rights, appeal must be made to principles that
are independent of particular circumstances. "Legal language
seeks universal applicability, regardless of the particular traits of an
individual. ' 61 Such adjudication is appropriately effected by a neu-
tral judiciary on the basis of objective principles of law. Accord-
ingly, the primary goal of adjudication is circumstantially to
vindicate abstract universal rights; "law is conceptualized as a rule-
bound system for adjudicating the competing rights of self-inter-
ested, autonomous, essentially equal individuals capable of making
unconstrained choices. ' 62 The language of law is spoken by ajuris-
prudential voice singularly universal and programmatically ab-
stract.63 Hence its formal character.
other, to corresponding responsibilities, or to the general welfare.
Lacking a grammar of cooperative living, we are like a traveler who can
say a few words to get a meal and a room in a foreign city, but cannot
converse with its inhabitants.
GLENDON, supra note 42, at 14.
Rights talk generates a sociality resembling more a cacophony of discord than a
community of discourse. Such discord, moreover, is not happenstance. It is structur-
ally intrinsic to the moral discourse of rights talk. "The fact is that the.., ideal of self-
sufficiency cannot be successfully democratized. A large collection of self-determin-
ing, self-sufficient individuals cannot even be a society." GLENDON, supra note 42, at
74. The abstract autonomous individual that programmatically speaks rights talk is
intrinsically non-social. Its governing social interest is self-interest. "Buried deep in
our rights dialect is an unexpressed premise that we roam at large in a land of stran-
gers .... " GLENDON, supra note 42, at 77.
60 Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity: Using Carol Gilligan and
an Ethic of Care in Law, in GENDER AND LAw 592 (Katharine T. Bartlett ed., 1993).
61 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 45.
62 Finley, supra note 8, at 896.
63 This abstract universalism of the law has recently come under rather severe criti-
cal scrutiny by non-Western writers whose cultures have been forced to endorse the
rights talk of the West-a rights talk spoken by an international law that to date has
been dictated by Western jurisprudence. "The prevailing human rights discourse...
is abstracted from social history and thereby arrives at conclusions which make
human rights both eternal in historical time and universal in social place." ISSA G.
SHIvJI, THE CONCEPT OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA 43 (1989). Such writers voice the
suspicion that the abstract universalism of the West may very well be peculiar to the
West. See generally Ziyad Motala, Human Rights in Africa: A Cultural, Ideological, and
Legal Examination, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 373 (1989); Makua wa Mutua,
The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of the Language of
Duties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 339 (1995); J.B. Ojwang, Laying a Basis for Rights: Towards a
Jurisprudence of Development, in ARcIAN LAw AND LEGAL THEORY 351 (Gordon R. Wood-
man & A.O. Obilade eds., 1995); Raimundo Panikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a
Western Concept?, 120 DIOGENES 75 (1982).
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The language of law thus manifests the logic of the written
word both formally and substantively. Formally, it codifies social
reality in terms of the abstract universal jurisprudence of rights
talk. Substantively, it speaks the language of abstract autonomous
individuals universally possessing such rights. Historically, how-
ever, the authors of legal language have not so much been abstract
autonomous individuals as they have been men. "Men have shaped
it, they have defined it, they have interpreted it ... ."64 Feminist
legal scholars therefore suspect legal language of expressing not so
much an abstract universal jurisprudence as expressing the particu-
larly masculine jurisprudence of its authors.65 But inasmuch as the
language of law speaks with the voice of authority, it effectively priv-
ileges the male perspective as authoritative. Feminists therefore
further suspect that legal language disguises the male voice as the
universal voice. "Because it is embedded in a patriarchal frame-
work that equates abstraction and universalization from only one
group's experiences as neutrality, legal reasoning views male exper-
iences and perspectives as the universal norm around which terms
and entire areas of law are defined."6 7 The abstract universal voice
of legal authority is therefore suspected by feminists as being the
distinctively male voice of its authors.6"
This feminist suspicion generates the perception that the logic
of legal language is itself distinctively masculine. The language of
abstract universality and autonomous individuality is construed as
the linguistic penchant of men.69 As such, it ostensibly serves dis-
tinctively masculine interests:
Legal language frames the issues, it defines the terms in
which speech in the legal world must occur, it tells us how we
64 Finley, supra note 8, at 892.
65 Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 1, 58 (1988) [hereinaf-
ter West, Jurisprudence and Gender].
66 Finley, supra note 8, at 897.
67 Finley, supra note 8, at 897. Finley describes in some detail how the masculine
perspective governs the law of torts, contracts, labor, and crime. See Finley, supra note
8, at 892-902. In understanding whether someone is negligent, how agreements
should arise and be enforced, how a worker should be regarded and treated, and the
appropriate response to criminal activity, the man's perspective is taken as "natural,
inevitable, complete, objective, and neutral." Finley, supra note 8, at 892.
68 Finley, supra note 8, at 897.
69 "Universal and objective thinking is male language because intellectually, eco-
nomically, and politically, privileged men have had the power to ignore other per-
spectives and thus come to think of their situation as the norm, their reality as reality,
and their views as objective." Finley, supra note 8, at 893. See alsoJennifer Nedelsky,
The Challenges of Multiplicity, in GENDER AND LAw 878, 880 (Katharine T. Bartlett ed.,
1993); West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 65, at 590; Minow, Justice Engendered,
supra note 6, at 33-45.
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should understand a problem and which explanations are ac-
ceptable and which are not. Since this language has been
crafted primarily by white men, the way it frames issues, the way
it defines problems, and the speakers and speech it credits, do
not readily include women. Legal language commands: abstract
a situation from historical, social, and political context; be "ob-
jective" and avoid the lens of non[-]male experience; invoke
universal principles such as "equality" and "free choice;" speak
with the voice of dispassionate reason; be simple, direct, and cer-
tain; avoid the complexity of varying, interacting perspectives
and overlapping multi-textured explanations; and most of all,
tell it and see it "like a man"-put it in terms that relate to men
and to which men can relate.70
To the extent that legal language serves characteristically mascu-
line interests, it disserves characteristically feminine interests. This
point is readily made by the feminist critique of rights talk.
The controlling insight of feminist discomfort with rights talk
is that rights universally inhere in human beings to the extent, and
only to the extent, that a human being shares the fundamental
sameness of humanity presupposed by rights talk. 71 Rights talk sys-
tematically excludes from the ambit of equal regard those who dif-
fer from the essential sameness allegedly characteristic of human
beings. To the extent that women fail to manifest this essential
sameness of abstract autonomous individuality, rights talk fails to
address them.7 2
Mary Ann Glendon has observed that, contrary to the para-
digm of abstract autonomous individuality, women in our culture
concern themselves with the "values of care, relationship, nurture,
and contextuality."7' Because rights talk fails to address itself to
this concern, it fails to speak to women. "Once again, the premise
of a basic human nature, found in the abstract individual . . . risks
excluding any who do not meet it."' 74 As Robin West contends, wo-
men concern themselves with communal connection, men with in-
dividuated disconnection. 75 Rights talk serves the interests of the
70 Finley, supra note 8, at 905.
71 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE 147 (1990) [hereinafter MINOW,
MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE].
72 Rights talk "presumes to address only autonomous, independent individuals
who can separate themselves from others and enter freely, unencumbered, into an
agreement about how to conduct private and public affairs." Id. at 150.
73 GLENDON, supra note 42, at 174.
74 MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 71, at 156.
75 West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 69, at 2-3. See also Nedelsky, supra note
68, at 880; Finley, supra note 8, at 905. This disparity between masculine and femi-
nine interests is commonly characterized in feminist literature as the difference be-
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latter, and therefore disserves the interests of the former.76
To the extent, however, that women live within the legal cul-
ture authored by men, their distinctly feminine interests are sub-
jected to the distinctly male interests that govern the language of
the law. As Martha Minow argues, "[a] notion of equality that de-
mands disregarding a 'difference' calls for assimilation to an un-
stated norm." 7 This unstated norm, of course, is the male norm
ostensibly articulated by rights talk of the universal abstract autono-
mous individual. Inasmuch as the rights talk of law serves to struc-
ture social reality, female experience of this reality is mediated
through male paradigms.7" Ann Scales refers to this as the "episte-
tween an ethics of rights and an ethics of care. Nancy Levit, Feminism for Men: Legal
Ideology and the Construction of Maleness, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1037, 1045 (1996).
76 The discomfort of feminism with rights talk, then, is twofold. On the one hand,
it has to do with the nature of equality presupposed by such talk.
An admirable commitment to universality and inclusion accompa-
nies this idea, an idea that all individuals could be self-sufficient and
that all individuals, if removed from context, would share a fundamen-
tal humanity .... All persons are equal because of this fundamental
sameness-yet this sameness seems to be the emptiness left when we are
each sheared of all that makes us different.
MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 71, at 152 (footnote omitted). Rights
talk proclaims an essential humanity equally inherent in all human beings, speaking
as if this essential humanity were universal. But this universality of essential human
being, this sameness that allegedly characterizes us all, is particularly male. It
programmatically excludes the female. "The presentation of a type of human being
as though it described all human beings risks excluding any who do not fit or treating
such misfits as deviant." MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 71, at 153.
From the feminist perspective, equal rights talk serves to perpetuate the very inequal-
ity it speaks against.
On the other hand, the social divisiveness that rights talk structures into the soci-
ety that speaks it seems uniquely unsuited to the concerns of women. "[R]ights talk
disserves public deliberation not only through affirmatively promoting an image of
the rights-bearer as a radically autonomous individual, but through its corresponding
neglect of the social dimensions of human personhood." GLENDON, supra note 42, at
109. Historically, women are uniquely concerned with this social dimension:
Traditionally, it has been women who have taken primary responsi-
bility for the transmission of family lore and for the moral education of
children. As mothers and teachers, they have nourished a sense of con-
nectedness between individuals, and an awareness of the linkage among
present, past, and future generations. Hence the important role ac-
corded by many feminists to the values of care, relationship, nurture,
and contextuality ....
GLENDON, supra note 42, at 174.
Rights talk therefore fails to address itself to the interests that women typically
exhibit in the essentially communal nature of their being human. Rights talk engen-
ders a society that structurally ignores the female by virtue of its peculiarly male stan-
dard: abstract autonomous individuality.
77 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 32.
78 See DALv, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 50.
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mological privilege" of men: "[w]omen in this culture have typi-
cally had indirect experience, a mediated relationship to reality, as
men both controlled women's access and preserved direct access
for themselves."79 Women are not only excluded from the para-
digm of humanity that allegedly provides for human equality, but
distinctively feminine interests are also structurally eclipsed by the
distinctively male interest in preserving this paradigm.
Rights talk thus constructs a difference between men and wo-
men. But this difference is not innocuous. As Catherine MacKin-
non argues, it is constructed as a difference of inequality-an
inequality between men and women engendered by the very terms
of equality.80 "The systematic relegation of an entire people to a
condition of inferiority is attributed to them, made a feature of
theirs, and read out of equality demands and equality law, when it
is termed a 'difference."' 8 1 Moreover, by virtue of the constructed
difference between men and women created by rights talk, the
equality it dictates fails to address how women are distinct from
men. Such inequality announces itself as male dominance.
"[S] exual difference is a function of sexual dominance. '"82 The lan
guage of law, in other words, constructs between men and women
a relationship of oppression. 5
79 Ann Scales, Militarism, Male Dominance and Law: Feminist Jurisprudence as Oxymo-
ron?, 12 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 35-36 (1989). Much of Mary Daly's reflection has to
do with this masculine submergence of the feminine. See especially DALY, PURE LUST,
supra note 38. "Unable to recall the Source within, women become amnesic; unable
to make verbal connections, women become aphasic. Sometimes able to speak, but
not trusting words enough to act on them, women become apraxic.. . ." DALY, PURE
LUST, supra note 38, at 94. To regain access to reality (their own reality), women must
accordingly break out of the "tamed/tracked modes of thinking/feeling of phal-
locracy." DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 7. For Daly, this is essentially a linguistic
enterprise whereby women may reclaim the power of their speech. "Breaking the
bonds/bars of phallocracy requires breaking through to radiant powers of words, so
that by releasing words, we can release our Selves." DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at
4. As will become increasingly evident as this discussion proceeds, I remain heavily
indebted to the work of Daly, who in my estimation (albeit male), counts among the
leading thinkers of this century.
80 CATHERINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 242
(1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE]. "[M]ale
forms of power over women are affirmatively embodied as individual rights in law."
Id. at 244.
81 Id. at 243.
82 Id. at 130.
83 As the articulation of abstract autonomous individuality, rights talk ostensibly
valorizes the male over the female. As such, it functions to legitimize the oppression
of women. The constructed difference between men and women spoken by rights
talk engenders an inequality that culturally articulates itself in terms of the subjuga-
tion of women to men. Id. at 242. This domination, however, is not so much explic-
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Rights talk functions structurally to oppress women.
8 4 Au-
thored by men, legal language constructs a social reality ostensibly
serving the distinctively masculine interests of universal abstract au-
tonomous individuality. It consequently identifies the interests of
care, context, connectedness, and community as being distinctly
feminine characteristics while simultaneously disserving them.
5
This difference is structured, moreover, as a difference of inequal-
ity effected by the very terms of equality dictated by legal language.
Those concerns characterized as feminine are consequently sub-
verted to those concerns characterized as masculine. The gender
inequality authored by legal language therefore reflects the sexual
authority that men exercise over women. "As sexual inequality is
gendered as man and women, gender inequality is sexualized as
dominance and subordination."8 6 Legal language therefore speaks
a social reality structured in terms of sexual oppression: "sexual dif-
ference is a function of sexual dominance."
87 This dominance is
exercised, and exercised exclusively, by men.
88
The language of law is therefore gendered in terms of sex.
MacKinnon supports this contention in calling attention to Kate
Millet's central thesis in Sexual Politics.89 Sex has political aspects
which involve both power and domination.
9" Sexuality provides
the relational paradigm between men and women in terms of
which the gender inequality of social reality is articulated. "[Sex] is
a pervasive dimension of social life, one that permeates the whole,
a dimension along which gender occurs and through which gender
is socially constituted .. ..*"" Throughout feminist literature, sexu-
itly endorsed by rights talk as it is presupposed by rights talk. It is therefore not
generally subject to legal challenge.
So long as power enforced by law reflects and corresponds-in form
and substance-to power enforced by men over women in society, law is
objective, appears principled, becomes just the way things are. So long
as men dominate women effectively enough in society without the sup-
port of positive law, nothing constitutional can be done about it.
Id. at 239.
84 As Kathryn Abrams remarks, the central claim of MacKinnon and the feminism
that she represents is that "coercion is paradigmatic of heterosexual relations and
constitutive of the social meaning of gender under gender inequality." Kathryn
Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, in GENDER AND LAW 907, 908 (Katharine T. Bart-
lett ed., 1993).
85 See Finley, supra note 8, at 905-06.
86 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 241.
87 MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 130.
88 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 127.
89 KATE MILLET, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970).
90 Id. at xi.
91 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 130.
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ality is perceived as the exercise of male oppression over women:
"the important difference between men and women is that women
get fucked and men fuck: 'women,' definitionally, are 'those from
whom sex is taken []' ..... 92 Sexuality constructs women as objects
for sexual use by men.93 Sexuality is therefore constructed to serve
male sexual interests.94 Sex is penetration; sexual pleasure a func-
tion of erection and ejaculation.95 Distinctly feminine sexual inter-
ests are subjected to distinctively masculine sexual interests. Men
are the subject of sex; women its object.
The language of law therefore reflects the social reality of sex:
male domination of women. "Male dominance is sexual."96 The
law is ostensibly authored by men to serve socially constructed male
interests while the authority of law is exercised to disserve socially
constructed female interests. "Male power is a myth that makes
itself true."9 7 Social reality is consequently constructed in terms of
gender inequality. To the critical eye of feminism, men appear as
the subject of this construction and women its object.9" Those who
have a penis wield the pen. Social reality is written accordingly.
92 West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 65, at 13.
93 "Being a thing for sexual use is fundamental to [women]." MACKINNON, TO-
WARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 130. Although lesbian sexu-
ality might seem to obviate this claim, it actually vindicates it-at least, from a general
cultural perspective. "Lesbianism, when visible, has been either a perversion or not,
to be tolerated or not." MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State, supra
note 39, at 531. From a lesbian perspective, of course, sex between women is viewed
quite differently as an expression of the wholeness of women as women, i.e., as not a
function of men. Rather, sex is seen "as an act of self-assertion and solidarity between
women, it responds to repression precisely by rejecting the degrading role imposed
on women by men's definition of them as dependent, relative beings that exist not for
themselves but for men." GINETrE CASTRO, AMERICAN FEMINISM 107 (1990).
94 "[W] hat is sexual is what gives a man an erection. Whatever it takes to make a
penis shudder and stiffen with the experience of its potency is what sexuality means
culturally." MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at
137.
95 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 137.
MacKinnon notes that when someone announces (for whatever reason) they had sex
three times, this means that the man had three orgasms. MACKINNON, TOWARD A
FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 133. On the other hand, female
sexual pleasure is generally understood as either "relatively unimportant... or myste-
rious.... Female sexual pleasure is constructed as unreliable or incomprehensible
(or even voracious and insatiable) in a phallocentric culture." Smart, supra note 41,
at 202. "[W] omen are often understood to be guardians of what men most want, but
of which they have little understanding." Smart, supra note 41, at 202. What men
most want-sex-is "inconveniently located in women's bodies." Smart, supra note
41, at 202.
96 MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 127.
97 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, Supra note 80, at 104.
98 "A theory of sexuality becomes feminist methodologically . . . to the extent it
treats sexuality as a social construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women,
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Hence the penile code: "Man fucks woman; subject verb object.""
9
IV. BREAKING THE PENILE CODE
Patriarchy is itself the prevailing religion of the entire planet, and its
essential message is necrophilia.'00
A governing presumption of the above feminist critique of the
penile code is that the code is authored by men as the exercise of
sexual authority over women. This presumption yields the picture
of pre-textual man utilizing the text of law to oppress pre-textual
woman. "Sexuality remains largely pre-cultural and universally in-
variant, social only in that it needs society to take socially specific
forms."10' The sexuality of law-its constructed gender inequal-
ity-is thus construed as a function of pre-existent male interests
exercising authority over pre-existent female interests. Legal lan-
guage is thus presumed to articulate pre-linguistic sexual identity-
an identity pre-structured in terms of the oppression of women by
men.102
Carol Smart has remarked:
It is, therefore, important for feminist theory to go beyond anal-
yses of law which stop at the point of "recognition" that men (as
a taken-for-granted biological category) make and implement
laws whilst women (as a taken-for-granted biological category)
are oppressed by them. We need instead to consider the ways in
which law constructs and reconstructs masculinity and feminin-
ity, and maleness and femaleness, and contributes routinely to a
common-sense perception of difference which sustains the so-
cial and sexual practices which feminism is attempting to
challenge.
103
The suspicion voiced here is that the gender inequality constructed
by legal language is not properly understood as a function of prel-
inguistic sexual inequality. For feminist thought, this suspicion has
devolved from the perception that the supposition of prelinguistic
sexual identity in fact commits feminism to the same conceptual
error of which it accuses the masculinism of legal language-
namely, mistaking the perspectival for the universal, the partial for
and constitutive of the meaning of gender." MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY
OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 128.
99 MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State, supra note 39, at 541.
100 DALY, GYN/ECOLOGY: THE METAETHICS OF RADICAL FEMINISM 39 (1978) [herein-
after DALY, GYN/EcoLOGY] (emphasis added).
101 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 132.
102 Smart, supra note 41, at 207.
103 Smart, supra note 41, at 201.
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the impartial, the subjective for the objective. 0 4 This is as much
true, moreover, for the prelinguistic sexual identification of men as
it is for that of women.
On the one hand, the supposition of a prelinguistic sexual
identity for women presumes that all women-as women-exhibit
a common, essential femininity."' But to many feminists, this es-
sential femininity fails to account for the experience of a great
many women." 6 Not only, however, does such an essentialized
femininity illegitimately presuppose some sort of monolithic fe-
male experience; it further presupposes that this female experi-
ence is normative. As Martha Minow remarks, this latter
presupposition uncritically endorses the traditionally male para-
digm of knowledge whereby the perspective of the few is mistaken
for the truth of the many:
Thus, feminists make the mistake we identify in others-the
tendency to treat our own perspective as the single truth-be-
cause we share the cultural assumptions about what counts as
knowledge, what prevails as a claim, and what kinds of intellec-
tual order we need to make sense of the world.
10 7
In other words, such an essentialist perspective commits the same
conceptual error of abstract universalism that feminism would ac-
cuse men of having committed.0 8 "We risk becoming embroiled
104 "[B]y urging the corrective of the women's perspective, or even a feminist stand-
point, feminists have jeopardized our own challenge to simplification, essentialism,
and stereotyping." Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 62.
105 ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WoMAN 3 (1988).
106 Smart, supra note 41, at 200. Indeed, to many feminists, such an essential femi-
ninity looks suspiciously particular to the norm of womanhood advocated by the
white, educated middle-class of the West. See Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It
and Losing It, in GENDER AND LAW 872, 872 (Katharine T. Bartlett ed., 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Minow, Feminist Reason]; SPELMAN, supra note 105, at 3; Levit, supra note 75, at
1050; Annie Bunting, Theorizing Women's Cultural Diversity in Feminist International
Human Rights Strategies, 20J.L. & Soc'v 6, 12 (1993).
107 Minow, Feminist Reason, supra note 106, at 874.
108 This has led some feminists to deny the possibility of a "feminist epistemology"
altogether-inasmuch as such an epistemology would presuppose a universal and ab-
stract access to the truth of matters, irrespective of the perspective of those seeking
such access. Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 64. As Audre Lorde remarks,
"the master's tools will never dismantle the master's house. They may allow us temporarily to
beat him at his own game, but they will never enable us to bring about genuine
change." Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle The Master's House, in
THIS BRIDGE CALLED My BACK 98, 99 (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldfia eds., 1983).
As far as I can tell, much of this line of feminist thought has devolved from the decon-
structionist philosophy of Jacques Derrida, as filtered through the historical writings
of Michel Foucault. See Annie Bunting, Feminism, Foucault, and Law as Power/Knowl-
edge, 30 ALBERTA L. REv. 829 (1992). "Deconstruction clearly rejects any essential cat-
egory of woman." Bunting, supra note 106, at 11.
[Vol. 2:1
THE PENILE CODE
in what we critique, entranced by what we would demystify."'
0 9 In
effect, by excluding those women who fail to exhibit the abstract
universal character of what is essentially feminine, the supposition
of a prelinguistic female sexual identity undermines the very devo-
tion to care, connectedness, and community that it normatively ad-
vocates. 11° For these reasons, feminism has become increasingly
disenchanted with the notion of a prelinguistic sexual identity of
women.
1 1
On the other hand, the supposition of a prelinguistic sexual
identity for men presumes that all men-as men-exhibit a com-
mon, essential masculinity. Inasmuch as feminism has largely de-
voted itself to the distinctive interests of women, feminist inquiry
into the distinctive interests of men has not been pursued to any
great extent. "[A]part from the crucial role of culprit, men have
been largely omitted from feminism."'1 12 Nevertheless, feminist
thought has generally presumed a prelinguistic sexual identity of
men distinctly antithetical to that of women." This antithesis,
moreover, is generally assumed to exhibit the logic of domination.
"Dominance eroticized defines the imperatives of its masculinity,
submission eroticized defines its femininity." '114 The same criti-
cisms may be offered against the notion of prelinguistic male sex-
ual identity as were offered above against the notion of a
prelinguistic female sexual identity. Moreover, the supposition of
a prelinguistic male sexual identity would seem particularly
counterproductive to the feminist agenda, namely, to dismantle
the structures of male oppression. If men are essentially oppres-
sive, the only viable way to end male oppression would be to elimi-
nate all men.11 The structures of an oppressive social reality can
109 Minow, Justice Engendered, supra note 6, at 65.
110 "In theory, [feminism] demands that we make particularity, context, and diver-
sity central, that we learn to be wary of generalization, that we pay attention to a
multiplicity of voices and perspectives without assuming that they will fit into any
preconceived category .... Nedelsky, supra note 69, at 881-82.
111 Levit, supra note 75, at 1049.
112 Levit, supra note 75, at 1038.
113 "The potential for material connection with the other defines women's subjec-
tive, phenomenological and existential state, just as surely as the inevitability of mate-
rial separation from the other defines men's existential state." West, Jurisprudence and
Gender, supra note 65, at 14.
114 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 130.
115 Or, to remove all men from all positions of power. Or, to have all women with-
draw from any institutions of power dictated by men. At its logical extreme, this
would entail not only that women remove themselves from all existing political-social-
economic structures, but that women ultimately cease speaking the language that con-
structs them.
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never be fixed if those who dictate them are essentially (hence,
invariably and inevitably) oppressive.
In effect, moreover, prelinguistic sexual identity renders the
essential identity of woman a function of the apposite sexual iden-
tity of men (and, of course, vice versa):
[D]iscourses which reproduce the taken-for-granted natural dif-
ferences reinforce our 'experience' as men and women. They
are also constantly drawn into a dualistic frame of reference
whereby the concept of woman is meaningful only so long as
there is a concept of man against which it can be formulated.
Woman becomes what man is not."
1 6
This is especially counterproductive to the feminist agenda of re-
lieving women of their status of being the object of sexual oppres-
sion. If women are identified essentially in terms of sexual
oppression, it becomes entirely unclear what an unoppressed wo-
man would be. "The point is that self-evident difference is presup-
posed even though it may be the overcoming of this difference
which is the goal." '117 Prelinguistic sexual identity thus restricts the
identity of women to their sexuality-a sexuality understood in
terms of oppression. "Woman becomes the eternal victim because
of her sex which is, in turn, a natural and self-evident attribute."" 8
Women are more-much more-than their sex. A feminism that
would restrict feminine identity to sexuality is a feminism that does
women a disservice.
The notion of prelinguistic sexual identity, then, whether for
men or women, seems particularly unhelpful and philosophically
problematic. The central question here is whether prelinguistic
sexual identity exists prior to the linguistic construction of gender
difference." 9 A positive answer would identify distinctively mascu-
line and feminine interests that dictate their linguistic construction
as such. 120 Sexual identity is thus presumed to govern the linguis-
tic construction of gender difference. Something prelinguistic,
however, cannot be identified. Identification is a distinctively lin-
guistic exercise. A prelinguistic sexual identity, in other words, is
oxymoronic because it is understood in no other terms than in
those dictated by linguistically constructed gender difference.
Consequently, the linguistic construction of gender difference is
not viably conceived as a function of prelinguistic sexual
116 Smart, supra note 41, at 204.
117 Smart, supra note 41, at 204.
118 Smart, supra note 41, at 208.
119 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER xi (1993).




The above perception has profound impact on the feminist
critique of legal language. 'Just as women have internalized stereo-
types of inadequacy, men may have internalized the stereotypic
images and behaviors of dominant norms." '1 2 2 Distinctively mascu-
line interests are as much a function of the linguistic construction
of social reality as are distinctively feminine interests.1 23 Legal lan-
guage, in other words, is not properly conceived as a tool whereby
the former dominates the latter. Language does not serve a prel-
inguistic scheme of sexual oppression. Rather, this language artic-
ulates a scheme of linguistically constructed gender difference.1
24
Judith Butler therefore asks: "[i]f gender is a construction,
must there be an 'I' or a 'we' who enacts or performs that construc-
tion?" 1 25 The perception here is that language is not dictated by a
prelinguistic subjectivity. The subject is as much linguistically con-
structed as the object of language.' 26 Man is not the prelinguistic
subject of language, nor woman its object. In a sense, language
speaks, and language speaks both man and woman.
1 27
But the critical question of this entire discussion still remains:
why does language engender the sexual oppression of women by
men? "Given the statistical realities, all women live all the time
under the shadow of the threat of sexual abuse"' 2 8-an abuse that
language reinforces in myriad ways by subordinating distinctively
feminine interests to distinctively masculine interests.
This reinforcement is due to the logic of the written word
121 Id.
122 Levit, supra note 75, at 1084 (footnote omitted). Levit argues "[t]o the extent
that legal precedents shape gender difference, the message is inescapably clear: real
men embody power; they are society's breadwinners, criminals, and warriors; and they
feel no pain." Levit, supra note 75, at 1114.
123 'Just as privilege is often invisible, so are the ways in which stereotypes trap
members of dominant groups." Levit, supra note 75, at 1080-81.
124 See generally, BUTLER, supra note 119.
125 BUTLER, supra note 119, at 7.
126 "Subjected to gender, but subjectivated by gender, the '1' neither precedes nor
follows the process of this gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of
gender relations themselves." BUTLER, supra note 119, at 7. See Bunting, supra note
108, at 831, 835-37.
127 An adequate understanding of this point would take us rather far afield into an
inquiry of the writings of Martin Heidegger, for it is he who provided the philosophi-
cal foundation for this entire line of thought. "We leave the speaking to language."
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, POETRY, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT 191 (Albert Hofstadter trans.,
1971). Ludwig Wittgenstein may also be understood to have contributed to laying the
same foundation. "Language must speak for itself." LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILO-
SOPHICAL GRAMMAR pt. 1, 2, at 40 (Rush Rhees ed. & Anthony Kenny trans., 1974).
128 MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 149.
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whereby language in general, and legal language in particular,
quintessentially articulates itself. I suggest it is due, in other words,
to the ocular epistemology of the pen. As discussed above, the
epistemological structure of the written word dictates not only the
character of the subject and object of knowledge respectively, but
dictates accordingly the character of textual authority. This char-
acter is reflected through an explanatory fixation of objectivity as
authored by an elided subjectivity-a subjectivity characterized as
universal abstract autonomous individuality and an objectivity char-
acterized as an externality over which the authority of the written
word is therefore exercised. As shown throughout our (written)
history, men have held the pen whereby women have been
penned. Man pens woman. As author, man is engendered by the
logic of the written word into the role of subject; woman is engen-
dered into the role of object. Hence the linguistic construction of
gender difference.
But what makes this linguistic construction of gender differ-
ence sexually oppressive? The written word pens reality: fixes it,
marks it, lays it out, and articulates it. By virtue of this penetration,
the text exercises its authority and thereby engenders an objectivity
in apposition to a consequently suppressed subjectivity. The writ-
ten word absents its author through the imposition of its authority.
Yet it is precisely through the imposition of this authority of the
written that the absent author ostensibly imposes his word upon
reality. The absent author thereby presents himself: a presence ef-
fected through the authority of the written word. As Mary Daly so
remarkably notes: "[i] t is important to remember that in patriarchy
women are vehicles that incarnate the male presence." '129 This is
the governing structure of sexual oppression engendered by the
linguistic construction of gender difference: "male omnipresence
is in reality an omniabsence that depends upon women for its in-
carnations ... ,,130 As subject, man imposes himself upon woman
as object. In effect, the logic of the written word generates a narra-
tive mythology of the suppressed self seeking to realize itself
through embracing the other than itself.'31
129 DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 143. She otherwise refers to this as man-
infestation of male absence. DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 146. (The term "man-
infested" was suggested to Mary Daly by Eleanor Mullaley in a 1980 conversation.
DALY, PuRE LUST, supra note 38, at 146 n.44).
130 DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 146. Note the implicit theological overtones.
131 "Every story that begins with original innocence and privileges the return to
wholeness imagines the drama of life to be individuation, separation, the birth of self,
the tragedy of autonomy, the fall into writing, alienation; i.e., war, tempered by imagi-
nary respite in the bosom of the Other." Donna Haraway, A Manifesto for Cyborgs:
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My contention, then, is that the logic of the written word-the
ocular epistemology of the pen-linguistically constructs gender
difference in terms of sexual oppression by virtue of the fact that
distinctively masculine interests are engendered by the logic of sub-
jectivity and distinctively feminine interests are engendered by the
logic of objectivity.132 Textual authority is consequently exercised
over women by those who ostensibly author the text, namely men.
Hence, the epistemological structure of the penile code.
However, the penile code conduces to a grand illusion. Tex-
tual authority is exercised by the logic of the written word, not by
those who author its text. Subjectivity is as much a construction of
the logic of the written word as is objectivity. The subject does not
dictate the logic of the written word. Rather, the logic of the writ-
ten word dictates the character of the subject vis-4-vis the dictated
character of the object. The author of a text does not author its
authority. Although the author seems epistemologically derivative,
an illusion is invariably created to the contrary. Those holding the
pen always claim the authority of the words penned. Inasmuch as
the pen has historically been held by those wielding a penis, men
have arrogated this authority to themselves. "Having assumed au-
thorship, [men] claim authority, using the divine .. .authority le-
gitimating their atrocities. 1'1  This claim constitutes the crux of
the feminist critique of language in general, and of legal language
in particular; for it is by exposing the illusory character of this
claim that the penile code may be broken.
V. CONCLUSION
Is my own understanding only blindness to my own lack of
understanding?'
The sum and substance of the above discussion is that because
men have authored the law, they arrogate to themselves the au-
thority of the law. This arrogation, moreover, is an illusion propa-
gated by the logic of the written word. Men do not dictate this
logic. Rather, it dictates us. It linguistically constructs the charac-
Science, Technology, and Socialist Feminism in the 1980's, in COMING TO TERMS: FEMINISM,
THEORY, POLITICS 173, 200 (Elizabeth Weed ed. 1989).
132 Hence Daly's contention that the governing agenda of "phallocracy" is to ex-
pose women, to render the mystery that woman is (to man) safe and unthreatening.
DALY, PURE LUST, supra note 38, at 62.
133 DALY, PuRE LUST, supra note 38, at 121.
134 LUDWIG WITrGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 418, at 54e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H.
von Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., Harper & Row 1972) (empha-
sis added).
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ter of subjectivity as well as the character of objectivity. Men have
been scripted in terms of subjectivity, women in terms of objectiv-
ity. Given the epistemological dynamic of the relationship between
these linguistic constructs, language structures a gender difference
articulated in terms of sexual oppression. The authority of legal
language is exercised accordingly-the penile code.
Perhaps the most disturbing consequence of this ocular episte-
mology of the pen is that it is essentially necrophilial. The logic of
the written word is a logic of death. Entombed within the order of
the written word, the linguistic construction of reality becomes per-
manently fixed, still, lifeless. Language is a corpus, executed in the
spill of ink, monumentalized through its texts.
The sexual oppression engendered by the penile code is ac-
cordingly necrophilial: "death [becomes] the ultimate sexual act,
the ultimate making of a person into a thing." '135 In ultima, the
logic of the written word dictates death. This is as much true, how-
ever, for the elided subject of the written word as it is for its pene-
trated object. Through the imposition of his illusory textual
authority, the absented author becomes unequally incarnate in the
lifelessness of his objectified victim.
So where is it written that man must exercise authority over
women? Nowhere, really. It is rather the logic of the written word
that ostensibly dictates such an exercise of authority. Nevertheless,
this dual sentence of death imposed by the penile code upon both
its subject and object is neither inevitable nor inviolate. Its dicta-
tion of authority devolves from a grand illusion-an illusion of au-
thority exercised by men over women. Illusions can be broken-
must be broken, if we are ever to live together equally as men and
women.
The illusion of authority ostensibly dictated by the penile code
may be broken, however, only if both its subject and object dis-
illusion themselves of its authority: women, through dis-illusioning
themselves of the exercise of authority over them; men, through
dis-illusioning themselves of the exercise of authority by them. Be-
cause the one dis-illusion is a function of the other, the penile code
may not adequately be broken independently by either women or
men.
For their part, women have already made significant in-roads
against the penile code. They have done so, ironically enough, by
writing. As authors, women violate the logic of sexual oppression
135 MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 80, at 140.
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historically endemic to the written word-not so much by virtue of
writing about women, but by virtue of writing as women. Women
voice themselves as women. To the extent that women voice them-
selves as women, they resist elision into the universally abstract au-
tonomous individuality of the absented author to which the logic
of the written word would otherwise subject them. If women are to
dis-illusion themselves of the authority ostensibly exercised over
them by the penile code, they must speak in a different voice-
their own voice.1 36 Women must hold the pen in their own hand,
and write as women. Only then may women be heard to speak with
the authority of women. Thus, by assuming the mantle of their
own authority as women, women dismantle the authority ostensibly
exercised over them by men.
For their part, men have made few inroads against the penile
code. This is not surprising, given the fact that men occupy the
more comfortable role in its exercise of authority over women.
Men would seem to have little incentive to break the penile code.
However, men are as much subjected to the oppressive logic of the
written word as women are objectified by it. As dictated by the
penile code, the exercise of male authority over the female elides
the identity of men. The logic of the written word engenders in
men the universally abstract autonomous individuality of the ab-
sent author. We are consequently alienated from ourselves as men.
We speak not with the authority of men, but with the authority of
authority-an authority exercised by the logic of the written word.
We will break the penile code only by writing as men. To the ex-
tent that we write as men, we eschew the universally abstract auton-
omous individuality to which we have historically been subjected.
In order to dis-illusion ourselves of the abstract authority ostensibly
exercised by us, we must speak with our own authority as men. By
thus assuming the mantle of our own authority as men, we disman-
tle the authority apparently exercised by us over women.
The penile code may be broken, then, by women writing as
women, and men writing as men. This is historically difficult for
women and conceptually difficult for men. Women must raise
their voice against the illusion imposed upon them that they have
no authority to speak. Men must lower their voice against the illu-
sion that they speak with the universal and autonomous authority
of the abstract author. Most importantly, both women and men
must hear each other speak. Only then will women and men speak
136 See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WO-
MEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1993).
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respectively as women and men, break the penile code, and help
end the sexual oppression of women by men.
